The theme of my paper is reflected in its title. I come to the conclusion that the Commission like its predecessor, the Conciliation and Arbitration Court, is essentially a facilitator rather than a prime mover or an innovator, reactive rather than proactive, in the formulation and application of industrial principles.
This conclusion may not seem obvious from a reading of tribunal decisions, particularly the earlier ones, or from media commentaries or indeed from the expositions of some academic writers.1 The impression is easily drawn from the announcement of a new principle or a new approach to wage fixing that, in some sense, the tribunal is its author or creator. And credit or blame is heaped on the tribunal, usually on its President, as the genius, benign or evil, rather than on the parties which appear before the tribunal. It is assumed that the tribunal has a kind of magic wand with the aid of which it can do this or that as it wishes, based on its own philosophy of what is good, a free agent able to take initiatives against the tide of forces in the labour market and beyond, an independent variable in the labour market equation.
Such a view of the tribunal's role is misleading. It is also dangerous because it creates expectations about the function and capacity of the arbitration system which arc unrealistic and perhaps even inconsistent with the terms of its existence. The Commission and earlier the Court, have generally performed in a manner dictated by their charter as set down in the Acts under which they operate. Promotion of the public interest is the key objective of the Commission and although "public interest" is not defined, it is a reasonable inference from various sections of the Act that concern for industrial peace and adverse economic consequences are the pillars on which this objective rests. The public interest is not served by prescribing of principles and policies, however admirable they may seem on paper, which do not work in practice, which arc flouted or which do not have general community support or which generate an unacceptable degree of unrest or adverse economic consequences.
Thus to serve its charter, the Commission has to tailor its principles and to apply them in a way which minimises adverse economic, industrial and social consequences. I choose to put it negatively rather than positively in terms of maximising economic, industrial and social benefits because, realistically, it is inherent in conflict resolution processes to minimise loss to the parties and to the community. This is not to say that mediation processes by conciliation and arbitration do not lead to constructive and positive developments in industrial re la tio n s .
It follows that in order to secure community commitment, the Commission must try to frame principles which by and large conform to community values and No system can be expected to work perfectly. But the direction of decisions has generally been to meet the requirements of the times. in fact, provided the only practicable starting point from which to approach the wage-fixing problem.
To supplement it, however, the Court has always been prepared to admit proof of any circumstances which may tend to show that, because of the economic situation in which either the employers or the employees, or both, find themselves, the adoption and perpetuation of previously current wage rates on levels would in fact be u n f a ir .1 5
The words "it is not for the Court to create standards" are worth emphasising.
The reduction in standard hours of work from 48 to 44 for many awards in the In male work, women workers who may be said to be in competition with male workers, would have to be paid the full male rate. In effect, in these circumstances, equal pay for equal work would apply but only to protect the male worker, the "typical breadwinner", from being undercut by female workers. In female work, the basic wage component was to be a fraction of the male basic wage, sufficient to meet the "normal needs of a single woman supporting herself by her own exertions" and not the normal needs of a family unit of five. As for margins for skill, female margins were to be based on relative work requirements and related to market rates.
Comparative wage justice would apply only within the segmented female labour market, and not across the whole labour market.
This principle was no more than a rationalised ratification of the social values and standards of the times.
But it was also consistent with supply and demand conditions which were in part determined by conventional attitudes on the place of women in the workforce.
As these changed and areas of work hitherto closed to women were opened up, so women's wages rose relatively in the market place, and awards followed suit. The course of women's wages in Australia followed that By introducing the principle of equal pay for equal value, the way was opened for the extension of comparative wage justice across gender lines. We think that broad changes of significance have occurred since 1969.
These changes are reflected in the attitudes of governments in Australia and in developments in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and elsewhere.
All these changes require us to reconsider the 1969 principles and to look at them in the light of present circumstances. We have given consideration to merely amending those principles but we consider that it is better for us to state positively a new principle. In our view the concept of 'equal pay for equal work' is too narrow in today's world and we think the time has come to enlarge the concept to 'equal pay for work of equal value'. This means that award rates for all work should be considered without regard to the sex of the employee.
In 1974, the Commission extended the (adult male) national minimum wage to females, describing it as a "logical extension of the equal pay principles" of 1972.
At the same time, it formally abandoned the notional family wage aspect of the national minimum wage (which had replaced the basic wage in 1966), noting the difficulty of "doing adequate justice to the widely varying family obligations of workers on the minimum wage", and reminding the parties that it was "an industrial arbitration tribunal, not a social welfare agency."1^ The break with the Higgins period was now formally recognised so far as the lowest wage of the "humblest class of workers" was concerned.
The Postwar Experience with Quasi-Collective Bargaining
The postwar social, industrial and economic climate had changed not only for women's wages but also for the kind of wage fixing approach which was tenable.
In the early postwar years, the tribunal lagged somewhat behind the change in the climate of the labour market. It understood that the basic wage had for some time gone beyond its original concept of being kind of national social minimum wage; because the basic wage was also a substantial component of most wages and salaries, its movement constituted a movement in the general level of wages.
Although unintended by its founders, an evolutionary process had placed in the This was followed early in the following year by a letter to the parties setting out a fourteen-point plan which went beyond wages and hours to taxation, subsidies, tariffs and monetary policy. The plan was rejected by the parties, not s u r p r i s i n g l y .
This case provides a lesson on the very narrow limits to which the tribunal can act as a prime mover; although, to be fair, Kelly's aim was a voluntary compact.
Calling a conference is unexceptionable. The abandonment of cost of living adjustments provided the impetus for unions generally to go outside the system for improvements as a matter of policy. Wages were being driven by overaward payments through shopfloor action and piece meal quasi-collective bargaining, the tribunal being drawn into these processes by way of conciliation and to ratify agreements and consent awards. These settlements increasingly set the standard for arbitrated awards in those areas where unions were weak and in pans of the public sector.
The dominance, which arbitrated decisions of tribunals had a ad over wage movements was being shared with collective bargaining; and, as I will argue presently, their inter-action gave us the worst of both worlds.
Of Not only must they continue to work to maintain the productive process, but it is inevitable that there will be further disagreements, at any rate about other issues from time to time.
Each particular solution may not be the solution sought by both or either of the parties but at least it must, in the ultimate, become acceptable to both.
Without this mutual acceptance the economic co-operation which is essential in the production of goods and services for the community will break down. ... The imposition of a settlement, to which one or both of the parties is strongly opposed may, in fact, result in a deterioration of the situation. Similarly, if the constant or near-constant impression is given that a party must be rapped over the knuckles for mistaken thinking or even misbehaviour, the efficiency of the system must inevitably suffer. In those areas where union power was still weak or was not being exercised, the Higgins approach of extending the standards established by collective bargaining, continued to apply.
There was nothing wrong in this approach provided industrial action and wage inflation were held at acceptable levels. Until the late 60's, this was the case. But then things started to go wrong. A three-tiered system of wage increases began to develop -national wage, piece-meal industry or award adjustments, and overaward payments -the amount at each level progressively boosting the others in an economically and industrially destructive way. In 1969, the Commission made a valiant attempt to limit increases beyond the "economic" increases granted in the national wage cases by stating the principles on which such other increases should be awarded. But the three-tiered system pushed on relentlessly, the overall increases in wages rising yearly to explosive dimensions and lifting prices accordingly.
I do not mean to imply that the wage fixing processes were the main villains of the piece. What emerged from the decentralised quasi-collective bargaining approach of the 1960's and early 1970's was that it proved to be highly inflationary.
No party desired such an outcome, but the absence of a self-regulating mechanism within the labour market which would avoid excessive wage and price increases created a self-destructive process as each group, quite rationally, pursued its own interest. What was needed in the circumstances was an mechanism which was able to take a macro view of sectional wage increases and avoid economic damage from excessive overall wage increase.
Experiments with Incomes Policy
It was in this context that the highly centralised and structured indexation system was introduced by the Commission in 1975. It is important to dwell a little on this phase of the history of the system; for it provides a telling illustration of the Commission as a facilitator. The case for wage indexation was argued principally by the unions and the Commonwealth Government. But they conceded that it would have to be part of a package of principles to ensure restraint on wage increase eminating from sources other than the national wage. It was argued that wage indexation would moderate inflation by removing self-fulfilling inflationary expectations from wage claims; that it was a fair basis for national wage adjustment; and that it would reduce industrial disputes. The employers and some of the States which opposed it contended that indexation would merely add another tier to the system with even more serious inflationary consequences.
I shall not dwell on the details of the package introduced by the Commission.
These are adequately covered in the literature.26 What I wish to emphasis is the basis on which the new approach was taken: it was that any increases in wages outside national wage would be negligible overall and would be processed by appropriate principles in an orderly fashion. A recurrence of the uncontrolled second and third tier increases of the magnitude which had occurred would destroy the prospects for indexation. The assurance of the ACTU on this assumption of the package was a material factor in the Commission's decision to accede to indexation. But the Commission had no illusions about the fragility of the system and it warned that "violation even by a small section of industry, whether in the award or non-award area would put at risk the future of indexation for all".27
Long before the Accord, the Commission was effectively being asked to embark on a quasi-incomes policy but with charge only of federal award pay. It therefore called for "supporting mechanisms" from governments to ensure that those matters which were outside the Commission's control but had an important effect on wage claims -prices, government charges and taxation -were handled in ways which would assist in wage restraint. The enthusiastic acceptance of the conditions by nearly all participants were evident three months later. It was a firm endorsement to continue with the centralised system. Inflation slowed down and industrial disputes fell.
Refinements were made to some of the principles in the light of experience and in due course, less than full indexation became necessary because of the state of the economy.
The new regime seemed to be working well for two years. Then it began to break down. The conditions necessary for its successful operation became progressively compromised as parties and governments lost their commitment to the system.
By the middle of 1979, the Commission was ready to abandon the system. The high degree of consensus on the requirements of the system which prevailed in earlier years had gradually evaporated. "It appears", the Commission summed up, "that one side wants indexation without restraints while the other wants restraints without i n d e x a t i o n " . 30 While believing that the existing system offered the potential for industrial and economic stability, this potential could not be realised without substantial commitment to its requirements. A passage, which was repeated by the Commission a number of times in later years, expresses in substance the theme of this paper: "The Commission has no vested interest in indexation or any other system of wage fixation.
In accordance with its statutory obligations, it seeks to apply that system which provides a viable balance between industrial and economic considerations".^ 1
The Commission called a conference to consider the future of the system. It reported later that there was "a universal desire that a centralized system should continue"; and that despite an absence of consensus on the structure and principle of the system, "there had been a significant narrowing of differences between the main parties".22
And so, in retrospect mistakenly, the system was kept alive until the middle of However, the mood for deregulation lapsed in the light of the wage explosion which emanated from such a system and the onset of a serious economic recession. In December 1982, the Commission convened at the request of the Commonwealth Government supported by the State Government and employers seeking a wage pause, in effect, a return to a centralised system. The unions did not put up a strong case against a pause, and in all the circumstances, subject to minor exceptions, the Commission prescribed guidelines for the pause for a period of 6 months, following which the matter would be reviewed.
A Federal election three months later brought a change of Government.
The new
Government was bound by an Accord with the trade union movement and committed to an incomes policy. The Commonwealth described its incomes and prices policy, a concept endorsed by the National Economic Summit, as the "corner-stone" of its economic strategy. The ACTU expressed a firm commitment
to a "no-extra-claims" provision within an indexation package. Further, the CPI was expected to be deflated by between 2 % and 3% by the introduction of Medicare. These were circumstances which made a return to something like the earlier indexation package, industrially and economically, a more viable p ro p o sitio n .
Support for a structured centralised system was well-nigh universal. But the employers, although conceding that price movements were a relevant consideration in national wage cases, were opposed to the inclusion of prima facie indexation in the package. However, the Commission was impressed with the "profound change in the context in which a centralized system would operate"
and it agreed operate such a system, setting out more explicitly than ever before the conditions for it to work effectively and concluding:
It will be clear that the conditions stated above as being necessary for full indexation to be viable, industrially and economically, go to the minimisation of labour cost increases outside national wage, consistency in the application of the Principles generally, the honouring of undertakings and the existence of supporting mechanisms which ensure restraint on prices and non-wage incomes, restraint on government charges and taxation especially those which feed into the CPI, and attention to the social w age.^ 3
The parties had to be reminded of the lessons learnt from the failure of the first indexation period! For about two years the new system worked reasonably well. But then a balance of payments crisis developed: the collapse in commodity prices turned the terms of trade sharply against Australia, the floating exchange rate depreciated substantially, and the international debt rose to an alarmingly high level.
The basis of the Accord -maintaining real wages and in time raising it -could not be sustained in this economic environment without a very large increase in unemployment.
The problem could only be overcome by a major restructuring of the economy, increasing exports especially of manufactured goods and services and reducing imports. Such restructuring called for increased international competitiveness which could be achieved without too drastic a fall in living standards if productivity increased sufficiently.
The importance of productivity growth was appreciated by the Government, and peak union and employer organisations. This was reflected in joint pronouncements on the subject,34 by the ACTU/TDC Report, A u stralia showed that allowing greater relative wage flexibility to operate in an unstructured system, did not in practice achieve greater relative wage flexibility.
Rather, the generalising effect of flow-on defeated the object and instead produced an excessive overall wage movement.
It was in the context of the serious developments in the economy and consensus on the need for greater productivity that the Commission heard an application in 1987 by the Confederation of Australian Industry for a two-tiered wage system: the first tier being the uniform national wage increase and the second tier being subject to a number of principles to be applied on an award by award basis. The second tier would include a principle which would allow a wage increase contingent on changes in work and management practices, multi-skilling, flexible time patterns of work and other such elements which would result in increase in productivity.
The concept was generally supported by the parties and governments and accordingly the Commission in substance adopted it.
Once again, it is important to note that initialise for the new system came from the parties which have to live with it. The notion of a "second tier" had of course also been a feature of the earlier indexation packages: simultaneous national wage increase for all awards and specific adjustments on an individual award basis depending on the particular principles being availed of. What was novel about this second tier^6 was that it was subject to an upper limit increase of 4%
and that it changed the balance in the amount of pay increase from being predominantly -well over 90% -in the first tier to around 50%. Thus, half of the potential wage increase would apply to individual awards at different times, rely on negotiations between the parties to achieve productivity improvements but they differed from earlier attempts to decentralise wage determination in that they impose an upper limit on the wage increase 
Concluding Observations
Let me now draw the threads together.
We have come a long way from the arbitration system as perceived by its founders. What was seen as constituting an adjunct of collective bargaining, has become an adjunct of national economic policy.
What was conceived as a fish has evolved into a fowl! Higgins and his successors up to the outbreak of World War II, saw as one of the objects of the system, the protection of the living standard of wage earners at the lower end of the wage scale.
Higgins' dream of "a new province for law and order" if men "secured the essentials of food, shelter, clothing, etc.", did not materialise, and probably never will in a democratic society. Further, the early period of federal arbitration saw persistent employer hostility to the system but, paradoxically, their many challenges on jurisdiction resulted in its extension.
However, the main point I have tried to make is that by and large, arbitration principles were framed in line with labour market norms and followed the rates struck by the market. In the circumstances of a changed economic and industrial environment, this view was unsustainable, and was overtaken by the realistic Kirby approach: Accommodative arbitration with primary emphasis on promoting industrial peace by conciliation rather than imposing by arbitration economic policy objectives which were outside the reach of the tribunal. The alternative, to become irrelevant and ineffective when there was call on its services, would be contrary to the Act. In a sense, it was back to the original concept of being an adjunct of collective bargaining.
The survival of the system under Sir Richard's accommodative approach made possible its later development into a more positive economic force. In the period of Sir John Moore's Presidency, the parties and governments came to accept the need for a more regulated approach to wage increases to overcome the damaging and self-defeating effects of unfettered sectional wage settlements. Accordingly, the Commission provided the means for a centralised system based on a comprehensive and coherent set of principles with national wage adjustment by indexation as its centre-piece. Later, the waning commitment of the parties and governments to the requirements of such a system, led the Commission to abandon it and to revert to a less structured award-by-award system dominated by collective bargaining settlements. The wage explosion which followed brought claim for a return to a centralised system, first through a wages pause and later back to indexation, now underpinned by the Accord and an incomes and prices policy.
The Commission complied to facilitate the achievement of economic and industrial stability but specified the requirements upon parties and governments for such an outcome.
In the early part of Mr. Justice Maddem's Presidency, a serious balance of payments crisis and the need for substantial productivity improvement to prevent further decline in living standards, called for a more enterprise-based wage policy. Again, although the Commission and the other tribunals were to be an instrument for development of a better balance between macro and micro objectives, the sources for the change were the parties and governments; and it is their commitment to the new system which made its implementation possible.
Thus from Higgins to Kirby, to Moore and to Maddem, each phase was conditioned To be viable, its policy must have broad acceptance, however grudging, from the main parties and be supported by governments. In must not apply its own doctrines and values but should try to establish those held generally by the community and by the labour market in particular. It is in this sense that the Commission is a facilitator rather than a prime mover or an innovator, reactive rather than proactive. A moment's thought should make it plain that an a rb itra to r's role cannot be otherwise.
... the Commission should not attempt to impose an unacceptable solution on the parties involved simply because of its legal position. I again stress that it must seek decisions which will be accepted, even though there may be disagreement with them, as being both appropriate and just in the particular circumstances of each case and to the extent that the acceptability is determined by the nature in which they are framed ... 3 8 Of course, the arbitration system has not been free of critics. Then there are cynics4^ who regard the Commission's ability to adapt and survive as due to its devilishly cunning capacity for self-serving. It has been said on the basis of the "capture" theory that the Commission and other industrial tribunals take a life of their own and promote their own interest rather than the public interest. Such assertion without evidence deserve no credit. Any institution, by fulfilling the terms of its charter, could be said to be furthering it own interest and survival. The test surely is whether it operates inconsistently with its charter and subverts the public interest in favour of its own interest. This is a matter of evidence which has so far not been presented.
May I finally make a few concluding observations.
To argue that the Commission is a facilitator rather than a prime mover and that its capacity to deliver one or other systems depends ultimately on the will of the parties is not to under-rate its critical importance in industrial relations and in economic policy. I said earlier that although the Commission and the State tribunals are not a sufficient condition for the system to work, they are a necessary condition.
The longstanding history of the Commission, its memory and its adaptability, give strength to its authority and acceptability as a facilitator. It is not the kind of institution which can be created in a hurry. Over the years, its procedures, especially in national wage matters, have been refined and speeded up. It is a forum for public debate on important industrial relations and wage issues. It is here that the Higgins "judicial" approach should be applied.
Finally, the history of the arbitration system shows its ability to adapt to changing economic and industrial needs. It is not an ossified centralist institution.
In recent times, in line with changed circumstances, it has shown the capacity to move to individual award and enterprise-specific wage adjustments within a centralised system. It has retained the centralised umbrella to ensure that the macro requirements of the system -the avoidance of excessive general money wage increases -arc not violated. As in the past, the future of the Commission will depend on its ability to sense and grasp the requirements of a changing industrial society. If these requirements turn out to be of the kind which calls for the abandonment of a centralised role or a differently structured role or one which operates more by conciliation than arbitration, there is within the system sufficient resilence to meet these requirements. The direction in which it moves will depend ultimately on those who are affected by its operationunions, employers and governments -and whose commitment to a particular approach is necessary for its success. The Commission has amply demonstrated that it has no vested interest in and no preconceived policy for any one approach.
On the basis of its history, it is reasonable to suppose that the Commission will facilitate the operation of the particular approach which is both sustainable and perceived to be, in the circumstances, best for the public interest. There will be mistakes and miscalculations from time to time. But perfection in industrial relations is for the millenium.
